As an avid blogosphere consumer, I’ve become intrigued by what policies are perceived as exercises of government power. What counts as coercion? Recently, the Antiplanner argued in favor of allowing food stamp recipients to spend food stamps on junk food:
It would be one thing if NCPPR were arguing that SNAP is a waste of money that should be eliminated. But its argument that government should only allow food stamps to be spent on healthy food effectively admits that NCPPR believes the government is capable of defining what is healthy. And if government can do that, why shouldn’t it extend its wisdom to everyone, instead of just SNAP recipients?
I couldn’t disagree more. In his last sentence, O’Toole seems to think that, by admitting the government is capable of deciding what counts as junk food, one necessarily admits the government should keep everyone from eating junk food. The conclusion (government should decide what everyone eats) does not follow from the premise (government should not buy junk food for poor people).
O’Toole’s leap is really symptomatic of a deeper intellectual failure in America’s conservative/libertarian politics: intransitive preferences. On issue after issue, America’s right wing has fought tooth and nail for Pareto-inferior middle ground. The confusions are explainable, however, when you consider that individual humans reason through symbols and heuristics rather than rules.
Small government advocates should really be interested in two things: (a) tax rates and (b) deadweight losses of regulation. Otherwise they should be orthogonal to policy…or perhaps utilitarian, preferring the state that maximizes welfare given X taxation and Y regulation.
Many libertarians, however, like O’Toole, focus on a tertiary aspect of policy: salient purposefulness. They cringe at top-down planning. But every policy accords with some plan, though, which begets the great irony of our policy era: if you successfully make the case against planning but fail in your quest to strip the government of a popular responsibility, all you’ve accomplished is to commit the government to a very bad plan…one that is probably planned by suppliers. Worst of all, for the libertarian, the outcome is inevitably profligate. I will give some examples
- Given a food stamp program, libertarians rally for coverage of junk food. Bryan Caplan, the uberlibertarian, asks his fellows, “Is it ‘government rationing of food’ if you can’t buy cigarettes with food stamps?” (link). For a given public expenditure on food stamps, it seems this simply lowers human welfare and does not change the price of the program.
- Given Medicare exists, libertarians oppose conscious decision-making about which treatments it covers. So Medicare grows unsustainably by spending money on unproven treatments and begets higher taxes, since, being perhaps the most popular program ever, it will never be eliminated. Again, Bryan Caplan lays it out:
Unlike most opponents of Medicare, I think that restricted reimbursements and so-called “death panels” are great ideas. If the government is paying the bills, saying “We’ll pay for whatever you want” or “We’ll pay whatever it takes to save you” is highly imprudent.
- Given the state monopoly on money, libertarians want tight money. Why? There is absolutely no philosophical justification. Every monetary stance is equally synthetic. Krugman and some other left wingers would point to sadism. But a simpler explanation suffices: expansionary policy in a recession is conducted with the express purpose of relieving the unemployed and ruined, so it feels more ‘interventiony.’ I believe if there were corporate debtors prisons, and the Fed adjusted policy with the express purpose of keeping these institutions afloat, then Ron Paul would argue for loose money under the same conditions that now stoke his deflationist paranoia. When behavioral economics is more widely understood, in fact, we will even explain historic FOMC policy this way, as Krugman has tested the waters with in one of my favorite of his posts (The Focal Point Fed). Interestingly, loving tight money will beget a much larger state as private individuals fail to find jobs and free market arguments fail the layman’s common sense.
Conservatives, on the other hand, go astray in their own ways, mistaking a different tertiary attribute for small government: profit salience. Dr. Steven Landsburg recently used a term “psychic harm” to talk about why people hold policy preferences over things that don’t personally affect them (although he used it in a strange context), and I would say conservatives derive “psychic benefit” or perhaps “existence value” from mental images of profit-taking, and this begets larger government (even apart from crony capitalism):
- Conservatives attack the means rather than the ends. Paul Ryan had an alternative to traditional Medicare that included two bold changes: (i) vouchers for private insurance and (ii) capped expenditure increases lower than Obama’s forecast. His program will never ever occur because of (i); but only (ii) impacts the total tax bill. Here’s a feasible small-government alternative proposal: {‘traditional Medicare structure’ + ‘capped expenditure increases lower than Obama’s forecast’ }. But I think Ryan was wedded to privatization…the image of someone, somewhere along the line distributing dividends, because profits are a sign of ‘marketocity.’ Therefore, America will have unadulterated Obamacare.
- Conservatives waste money on privatization. Privatization often saves money but sometimes doesn’t. It is an empirical matter. In episode of This American Life, Oklahoma state legislator Joe Eddins explains that privatization proved enchanting to Republicans when he secretly brought universal kindergarten to Oklahoma (transcript):
Joe Eddins
I probably sat down at their desk with each Republican and showed them two or three things in the bill that I thought they ought to know.
Alex Blumberg
And what were those things?
Joe Eddins
Well, I showed them where we were keeping four year olds out of kindergarten, we’re saving enormous amounts of money, you can contract with private providers, and they loved that. That’s all I said.
The money-saving came entirely from changing a loophole for kindergarten coverage, but Republicans seemed very excited about the fact of private providers even when that had nothing to do with the cost savings. Likewise, in another episode of This American Life (link):
So did the city really save any money here by outsourcing, by privatizing Roland’s job? We asked the city of Colorado Springs this question over and over again. And they hemmed and they delayed. They couldn’t find a number. Then they said it’s tough to calculate….
What I learned, though, from talking to the people in Colorado Springs is that for a lot of them these calculations don’t really matter. They don’t care if privatizing actually saves the government money, so long as the government is doing less.
Pause for a moment and reconsider the preferences embodied in the sentence: “They don’t care if privatizing actually saves the government money, so long as the government is doing less.” Why don’t they care about the lower tax rates afforded by cost savings? And why would they possibly care who’s providing the same service for a given tax bill? [Robert Smith is paraphrasing what he heard from a swatch of the community, but I believe he is a credible journalist (bio) who does a good job on Planet Money. ]
It strikes me as relatively easy to maintain public employment in Colorado Springs. Public unions could rebrand themselves as corporations that pay dividends to shareholders on a per-hour basis. By a coincidence the shareholders are also the employees who fulfill government contracts, but this is an internal matter no more of interest to the public than executive compensation at a landscaping firm. In fact, go ahead and make 100% of the employees executives and managers. I think Taco Bell did this for a while. In no time, you’s see tearful defenses of employee pay and ‘dividends’ from Colorado’s most ardent conservatives.
- Conservatives dislike government prizes but love patents, even though patents are a form of regulation with a massive deadweight loss. When Democrats tried to cut Medicare spending on drugs, Dr. Greg Mankiw said: “The Dems will likely give us lower drug prices and less research into new drugs. Good news if you plan to be sick soon. Bad news if you plan to be sick in the more distant future.” It would seem he has a preference for long-term R&D over deadweight losses from higher taxes used to finance Part D. But when Dr. Joseph Stiglitz wrote in favor of government prizes for new drugs, Dr. Mankiw said, “ He makes some good points, but remember that prizes have to be financed, presumably with taxes. The distortionary effects of higher tax rates could be worse than the distortionary effect of the temporary monopolies created by the patent system.” What’s consistent in both statements is a concern for drug companies’ profits.